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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Amnesty International1 filed a brief of amicus curiae'
with the Supreme Court of the United States3 urging the Court to find
1. Amnesty International is an organization devoted to mobilizing worldwide ob-
servance and protection of human rights. It "oppose[s] the death penalty uncondition-
ally in all cases, believing it to be the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punish-
ment and a violation of the right to life, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other international human rights instruments." AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS
1 (1991) [hereinafter AMNESTY].
2. Amicus curiae
[m]eans, literally friend of the court. A person with a strong interest in or
views on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may
petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party
but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Brief of Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioners, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-5765 and 87-6026).
(77)
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that the imposition of the death penalty on a sixteen or seventeen year-
old offender was prohibited by the Constitution's Eighth Amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment." As evidence, Amnesty cited the
capital punishment practices of other countries, a majority of which
have either abolished the death penalty, or have restricted it to persons
eighteen years of age and above.5 The Court held that the juvenile
death penalty was constitutionally permissible and rejected the rele-
vance of the sentencing practices of other countries. 6
While "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other de-
mocracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice
uniform among our people is not merely an historical accident,
but rather so 'implicit in our concept of ordered liberty' that it
occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting,
in our Constitution as well," they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is ac-
cepted among our people.7
Two years later, Amnesty issued a highly critical report that con-
demned the United States for being "in clear contravention of interna-
tional human rights standards."8 Intrigue with the forcefulness of Am-
nesty's rhetoric served as the impetus behind this Comment. Research
into this allegation reveals, however, that the U.S. position, domesti-
cally and internationally, is anything but clear. Domestically, for exam-
ple, execution practices among the states vary wildly. In fact, perhaps
the only definitive domestic position is the one adopted by the Supreme
Court-that the execution of defendants aged sixteen or seventeen is
not per se violative of the Constitution.9 Internationally, meanwhile, the
U.S. position is arguably hampered by constitutional constraints, such
as separation of powers. The U.S. position can even be viewed as con-
sistent with international law, because, for example, the U.S. has never
ratified treaties that prohibit the execution of juveniles. These issues
and others, will be explained in detail.
It is worth noting at the start that this author has not set out to
argue definitively that the United States is or is not in contravention of
international law, but rather to suggest that Amnesty's allegations are
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
5. AMNESTY, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.l (1989) (Scalia, J.).
7. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
8. AMNESTY, supra note 1, at Summary.
9. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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problematic and its evidence inconclusive. Nor has this author at-
tempted to venture down the "slippery morality slope" of evaluating
the social aspects of the U.S. position, choosing instead to examine the
issues from a strictly legal standpoint. Though the moral implications
may be far-reaching, they have little bearing on a determination of
whether the United States has violated international law.
To appreciate fully the implications of the international argument,
it is useful to have first an understanding of the domestic perspective on
the issue. Thus this Comment will begin with a brief overview of the
history of the death penalty in the United States and a discussion of
the recent case law. The focus will then shift to an examination of U.S.
domestic policy in light of international treaties and the ambiguous
realm of customary international law, followed by a discussion of the
issues underlying the U.S. position.
II. THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Context
The drafters of the Bill of Rights provided future generations of
Americans little guidance toward achieving an understanding of the
meaning and implications of the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel
and unusual punishment."'10 The topic has been the subject of much
scholarly debate and though interpretations vary, it is almost univer-
sally acknowledged that whatever forms of punishment the drafters in-
tended to prohibit by including the clause, capital punishment was not
among them."1 As early as 1642, capital punishment was imposed in
this country against offenders below the age of eighteen, 12 and execu-
tions continued long after the Eighth Amendment was adopted in
1791. 1' Thus, if Eighth Amendment analysis were rooted only in that
which was impermissible in 1791, the Court would not be required to
delve into the complexities of constitutional analysis, for at the time of
the Eighth Amendment's drafting, capital punishment was imposed
against offenders as young as eight years of age.' 4
To be sure, American culture has vastly changed from the society
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.
12. Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L.
REV. 613, 619 (1983).
13. Id. at 630.
14. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23-4; see also Streib, supra
note 12, at 614-15.
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that existed during the lives of the Framers. As our geographical
boundaries metamorphosed, likewise did American values and morality
in response to the challenges of an ever-changing world. In order for
constitutional principles and tenets to transcend the perpetual evolution
of American culture and have modern-day application, our understand-
ing and approach to these principles must also evolve. Justice McKenna
articulated this point in Weems v. United States:
15
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is
particularly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral en-
actments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach im-
mortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' 6
Though historical context has a place in modern day Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence,' 7 the cruel and unusual punishment clause
"is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes more enlightened."' 8 Chief Justice Earl Warren, in a
now famous passage from Trop v. Dulles,19 affirmed the dependency of
Eighth Amendment analysis on the American public's values and per-
ceptions when he instructed that the definition of cruel and unusual
punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2 0
Despite their respective contributions to Eighth Amendment anal-
ysis, neither Weems nor Trop involved the death penalty and thus did
not address the issue of whether capital punishment constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.
It was not until 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,2 that the Supreme
Court was presented with the issue. Petitioner Furman had been con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death.22 All nine Justices filed sepa-
15. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
16. Id. at 373.
17. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910).
18. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
20. Id. at 101; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Weems).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Id. at 239.
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rate opinions and per curiam,2" the Court reversed Furman's death sen-
tence, holding not that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional,
but rather that the Georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutional
in its failure to provide guidelines for imposing the death penalty. This
deficiency in guidelines consequently left the judge or jury with "prac-
tically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he
die." '24 Such discretionary statutes yield discriminatory results and
"discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual
punishment.' "25
In several cases that proceeded Furman, the Court refined its
Eighth Amendment analysis, 2 6 but it remained clear that a majority of
the Court was unwilling to find capital punishment per se unconstitu-
tional. The controversy, however, was far from settled. In 1987, the
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the execution of a fifteen
year-old offender violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 8
William Wayne Thompson had allegedly participated in the vicious
murder of his former brother-in-law, who was shot twice in the head,
cut in the throat and abdomen and thrown into a river with blocks
chained to his body.29 The trial court granted the State's motion to try
Thompson as an adult30 and he subsequently was convicted and sen-
23. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall each filed separate
opinions concurring in the judgment. Justices Brennan and Marshall found that the
Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment in all cases while Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, Stewart and White concluded that discretionary sentencing statutes, without guid-
ance, violated the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 248.
25. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that capital punishment is not per se invalid); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (holding that mandatory death
sentences are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (White, J., plurality opinion) (the imposition of the death penalty in a rape case
was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment and therefore constituted cruel
and unusual punishment); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that all as-
pects of defendant's character, record and crime are to be considered as mitigating
factors, including age).
27. See supra note 26.
28. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 474 U.S. 1084 (1987).
29. The alleged motive was, in part, the victim's physical abuse of Thompson's
sister. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. The judge ruled that "there are virtually no reasonable prospects for rehabili-
tation of William Wayne Thompson within the juvenile system and that William
Wayne Thompson should be held accountable for his acts as if he were an adult and
should be certified to stand trial as an adult." Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819-20 (quoting
1993]
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tenced to death.3" The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma af-
firmed."2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the sentence of death was cruel and unusual punishment when imposed
upon a fifteeen year-old." As in Furman, the Court was once again
divided, with Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun con-
cluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the im-
position of capital punishment upon offenders under the age of six-
teen.34 Justice O'Connor concurred in the result" and Justices Scalia,
White and the Chief Justice dissented.' 6
The following year the Court again granted certiorari on the issue
of the juvenile death penalty; this time the offender was seventeen.'"
Petitioner, Kevin Stanford, and an accomplice had allegedly robbed a
gas station and then repeatedly raped and sodomized the station at-
tendant. 38 They then allegedly shot her point-blank in the face and in
the back of her head.' 9 The Kentucky juvenile court certified Stanford
for trial as an adult, " and a trial court then convicted and sentenced
him to death."' Though the Court was once more divided, it was Justice
Scalia who announced the judgment of the Court, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices White and Kennedy with Justice O'Connor as the
swing vote.42 The Thompson dissenters now formed the majority and
held that the execution of a seventeen year-old offender did not consti-
trial court). Under Oklahoma law, a litigant may file a statutory petition seeking an
order to certify a juvenile defendant to stand trial as an adult. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 1112(b) (1981).
31. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 820.
32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780 (1986).
33. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
34. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818.
35. Id. at 848.
36. Id. at 859.
37. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
39. Id.
40. The Kentucky statute provided that a juvenile could be waived into the adult
system if he was either charged with a Class A felony or capital crime, or was over 16
years of age and charged with a felony. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (Michie
1982). In certifying Stanford, the juvenile court focused on petitioner's extensive his-
tory within the juvenile system and the gravity of the crimes and concluded that it
would be in the best interest of petitioner and the community if Stanford were tried as
an adult. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365. Subsequent to Stanford, the Kentucky statute
was repealed. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635.020 (Baldwin 1990).
41. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
42. Id. at 364.
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
tute "cruel and unusual punishment.""
There was no dispute in Thompson or in Stanford that the execu-
tion of a fifteen or sixteen year-old would not have been prohibited as
cruel and unusual punishment at the time the Framers drafted the
Eighth Amendment." The divergence between the plurality and dissent
in both cases focused on the question of whether in fact a current de-
monstrable societal consensus condemns capital punishment of offend-
ers at these ages." The two sides also diverged on what factors are
relevant to making this determination.
B. Societal Consensus
1. State Legislative Enactments
Consistent with Furman,"4 the Justices in both Thompson. and
Stanford looked for objective indicators of contemporary standards in
determining whether "evolving standards of decency" prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty against a fifteen or seventeen year-
old.47 The first of these indicators was the actions of state legislatures
with regard to the death penalty.4"
Writing for the plurality in Thompson, Justice Stevens restricted
his analysis to the eighteen states that set a minimum age at which the
death penalty could be imposed-all at sixteen years of age at the time
of the offense, 9 and concluded that those states that had addressed the
43. Id. at 380.
44. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissent); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368
(Scalia, J., plurality).
45. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-80, 394-405; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-38, 863-
78.
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972).
47. Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
48. "In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to
the will and consequently the moral values of the people." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 175-76 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383).
49. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 n.30. The following states set 16 as the minimum
age: CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West 1993) (age 18); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(1)(a) (1986) (age 18); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(l) (1989) (age 18); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (Michie 1990) (age 17); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)
(1992) (age 18); IND. CODE §§ 35-50-3(b), 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 1991) (age 16); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040(1) (1987) (age 16); MD. CODE ANN., art. 27 § 412(f)
(1992) (age 18); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1985) (age 18); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(XIII) (Supp. 1988) (age 18); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:4A-22(a) (West
1987), 2C:ll-3(g) (West Supp. 1992) (age 18); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-6-1(A), 31-
18-14(A) (Michie 1990) (age 18); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1992) (age 17);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Anderson 1987) (age 18); ORE. REV. STAT.
1993]
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issue did not permit the execution of a fifteen year-old.50 However, in
1988, when Thompson was decided, nineteen additional states permit-
ted capital punishment but declined to set a minimum age at which it
could be imposed.51 Stevens disposed of these nineteen states by con-
cluding that, because there must be a chronological age at which it is
unconstitutional to impose the death penalty, any state that did not
provide for a minimum age had simply not focused on the issue and
thus was not relevant to the discussion. 2
In her Thompson concurrence, Justice O'Connor also dismissed
the significance of these nineteen states, charging them with legislative
oversight. 3 She reasoned that the absence of a minimum death penalty
age is no indication that those state legislatures "have deliberately con-
cluded that it would be appropriate to impose capital punishment on
fifteen year-olds." 5 Without such deliberation from these nineteen
§§ 161.620, 419.476(1) (1991) (age 18); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-102(b)(3), 37-1-
102(b)(4), 37-1-103, 37-1-134(a)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (age 18); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.07(d) (West Supp. 1993) (age 17).
At the time Thompson was decided, Nevada had set a minimum age of 16.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 n.26. Presently, there is no minimum age provided for in
Nevada's death penalty statute. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.035(6) (Michie 1992).
Both Missouri and Wyoming changed their death penalty statutes to a minimum
age of 16 subsequent to the Thompson decision. Mo. ANi,. STAT. §§ 565.020, 565.030
- 565.040 (Vernon Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to 6-2-103 (1988).
50. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 826-29.
51. Id. at 829 n.26. The following states permit capital punishment but set no
minimum age: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59, 13A-6-2 (1982 & Supp. 1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-703 to -706, 13-1105 (1989 & Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 5-4-104(b), 5-4-601 to -617, 5-51-201 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082,
782.04(1) (West Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 921.141 (1985 & Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4001 to -4004, 19-2515 (1987 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30(C), 14:113 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-21,
97-7-67, 99-19-101 to -107 (Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301-305; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.10 to 701.15 (1981 & Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1102(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 & Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-
27A-1 to -41 (1988 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207 (1990 &
Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2303(b), 7101-7107 (1974 & Supp. 1990);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 1992), 19.2-264.2 to .5 (Michie 1990 &
Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.010 to 10.95.900 (West 1990 & Supp.
1992).
52. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
53. Id. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserted that there
are other reasons unrelated to capital punishment that would justify a state waiving a
16 or 17 year-old into the adult system, e.g., the length or conditions of confinement
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states, Justice O'Connor relied heavily on those states that had set a
minimum age: "[T]he most salient statistic that bears on this case is
that every single American legislature that has expressly set a mini-
mum age for capital punishment has set that age at 16 or above. ' ' 55 By
combining the eighteen states that set the minimum age at sixteen or
above with the fourteen states that had abolished capital punishment in
all cases, 6 she concluded that a majority of states prohibited capital
punishment below the age of sixteen.57 Justice O'Connor's opinion,
however, was limited to a narrow set of circumstances. Where the juve-
nile offender was subject to the penalty solely by virtue of the state's
adult waiver statute," the penalty would be unconstitutional if there
were 1) no national consensus forbidding capital punishment against
the age of the offender, and 2) no statute setting forth a minimum age
at which the death penalty may be imposed (thus evidencing a con-
scious legislative determination).
These circumstances were not present in Stanford. Applying her
Thompson analysis, Justice O'Connor concurred with Justice Scalia in
finding that the death penalty against a seventeen-year-old offender did
not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause.59 She concluded
that there was no national consensus against the imposition of capital
punishment on a seventeen-year-old offender; those states that had set
a minimum age for capital punishment had set it at sixteen or above. 0
Without a contrary national consensus, it was not necessary that a
state specify a minimum age at which capital punishment could be
imposed. 1
Writing for the dissent in Thompson, Justice Scalia considered the
and the safety of other juvenile offenders. Id.
55. Id. at 849. See supra note 49 for cites.
56. See supra note 49; ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.015, 12.55.125 (1990); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-2404 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656 (1988 & Supp. 1992);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, §§ 1251, 1152 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.316
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-50 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1992); W.VA. CODE § 61-
11-2 (1992); WIS. STAT. §§ 939.50(3)(a), 940.01 (1982).
At the time the case was decided, Kansas, Massachusetts and New York did not
permit the death penalty. Presently, all three states do. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4001
to -4014 (1988 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, §§ 57-71 (West
Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
57. See supra note 56.
58. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 850.
59. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 381 (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849).
61. Id.
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same statutes as did the plurality, yet reached a far different result. By
contrast, he found that those states that permitted the death penalty
but did not set a minimum age had neither declined to address the
issue nor inadvertently permitted the death penalty for juvenile offend-
ers.62 To the contrary, in these states the minimum age at which an
offender could be sentenced to death was a function of the state adult
waiver statutes.6 3
A survey of state laws shows, in other words, that a majority of
the States for which the issue exists (the rest do not have capi-
tal punishment) are of the view that death is not different inso-
far as the age of juvenile criminal responsibility is concerned.
And the latter age, while presumed to be 16 in all the States
.. . can, in virtually all the States, be less than 16 when indi-
viduated consideration of the particular case warrants it.64
Based on this reasoning, the Scalia voting bloc found that a majority of
the states which permit capital punishment theoretically permit it at
age fifteen.65 In Stanford, Justice Scalia noted that of the thirty-seven
states that permit capital punishment,66 only twelve have set a mini-
mum age of eighteen. 7 The remaining twenty-nine states permit the
execution of a sixteen or seventeen year-old by virtue of either their
death penalty statutes or by their adult waiver statutes.68 These statis-
62. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. id.
64. Id. at 868.
65. When Thompson was decided, 19 of 37 states that permitted capital punish-
ment, arguably permitted it against 15 year-old offenders. Id. at 867-68. See supra
note 51.
Further, when Thompson was decided, Nevada had set a minimum age of 16.
Presently, there is no minimum death penalty age provided for in Nevada's death pen-
alty statute. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.035(6) (Michie 1992).
66. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (Scalia, J., plurality).
67. Id. at 370 n.2. The following 12 states set 18 as the minimum age:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-
103(l)(a) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(l) (West 1989); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 9-1(b) (1979 & Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 412(f) (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(2) (Supp.
1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-22(a) (West 1987) and 2C:11-3(g) (West Supp.
1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-6-1(A) (Michie 1991), 31-18-14(A) (Michie 1990);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02(A) (Anderson 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.620
(1990), 419.476(1) (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-102(b)(3), 37-1-102(b)(4), 37-
1-103, 37-1-134(a)(1) (1991).
68. See supra notes 49, 51.
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tics, he concluded, did "not establish the degree of national consensus
this Court has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punish-
ment cruel and unusual."69
2. Federal Legislative Enactments
In addition to state enactments, the Thompson and Stanford
Courts also considered the federal position on the death penalty for
juvenile offenders. The Thompson dissent pointed to the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 198470 as further evidence that there was no
societal consensus against the execution of a fifteen year-old.7 1 Con-
strued with federal death penalty statutes, 72 the Act theoretically could
result in the execution of a fifteen year-old offender.7
Justice O'Connor refuted the significance of the Act in much the
same way that she refuted the relevance of the states that had not ex-
pressly set a minimum age in their death penalty statutes. Just as the
states failed to provide evidence by way of legislation and/or legislative
history that they had considered the minimum age at which capital
punishment could be imposed, Justice O'Connor pointed to the dissent's
69. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371 (Scalia, J., plurality).
70. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1982 & Supp.
IV) (lowering the federal waiver age from 16 to 15).
71. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting) The Act lowered the
age at which a juvenile can be tried as an adult in Federal District Court from 16 years
of age to 15.
72. The Thompson Court cited the following statutes:
10 U.S.C. § 906a (1988) (peacetime espionage); 10 U.S.C. § 918 (murder
while member of Armed Forces) (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 33, 34 (1982 &
Supp. IV) (destruction of aircraft, motor vehicles or related facilities resulting
in death); 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. IV) (murder of member of
immediate family of law enforcement officials) (by cross reference to 18
U.S.C. § 1111); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1982 & Supp. IV) (murder of member of
Congress, important Executive official, or Supreme Court Justice) (by cross
reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111); 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1988) (espionage); 18
U.S.C. § 844(f) (1982 & Supp. IV) (destruction of government property re-
sulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982 & Supp. IV) (first-degree murder
within federal jurisdiction); 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (1988) (mailing of injurious
articles'with intent to kill resulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988) (as-
sassination or kidnapping resulting in death of President or Vice President)
(by cross reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111); 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (1988) (willful
wrecking of train resulting in death); 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988) (bank rob-
bery-related murder or kidnapping); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1988) (treason); 49
U.S.C. app. §§ 1472, 1473 (1988) (death resulting from aircraft
highjacking).
73. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 866.
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failure to produce legislative history indicating that Congress expressly
intended to permit the execution of fifteen year-olds by enacting the
Act."' Further, O'Connor cited the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988"' as
evidence that the federal government did not intend to execute fifteen
year-olds.76 The Act authorized the death penalty in certain drug re-
lated killings but restricted its imposition to offenders eighteen years of
age or older.
Justice Scalia refuted the significance of The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988 referred to by O'Connor and held that the Act "does not
embody a judgment by the Federal Legislature that no murder is hei-
nous enough to warrant the execution of such a youthful offender, but
merely that the narrow class of offense it defines is not."" Further-
more, because a substantial number of state legislatures permit the ex-
ecution of offenders below the age of eighteen, he believed the absence
of a federal statute permitting the same "would not remotely establish
* . . a national consensus that such punishment is inhumane. '78
3. Jury Sentencing Patterns
In addition to the determinations of legislatures, the Court has
looked to jury responses in capital cases as a manifestation of Ameri-
can attitudes with respect to the death penalty.79 In Thompson, Justice
Stevens relied on statistics of capital executions when he concluded that
juries have rejected the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 80 Accord-
ing to the statistics, only eighteen to twenty offenders under the age of
sixteen have been executed during the 20th century-all prior to
1949.81
Justice Scalia harshly criticized the plurality's narrow use of the
statistics in Thompson. Noting the plurality's failure to consider the
number of capital sentences in addition to capital executions, Justice
74. Id. at 851 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
75. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (1988). Note that the Act had
not yet been enacted when the Thompson opinion was announced.
76. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852.
77. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 372-73 (Scalia, J., plurality).
78. Id. at 373.
79. Interestingly, as Justice Stevens noted in Thompson, it was the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of capital punishment by sentencing juries that was the determi-
native factor in finding the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman. Thompson, 487
U.S. at 831 (Stevens, J., plurality).
80. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832-33 (Stevens, J., plurality).
81. Id. at 832 (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 197
(1987)).
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Scalia reasoned that capital executions are "of course substantially
lower than those for capital sentences because of various factors, most
notably the exercise of executive clemency. "82 He further suggested
that focusing on the trend of the past forty years is not sufficient to
"justify calling a constitutional halt to what may well be a pendulum
swing in social attitudes." 83 Though he conceded that the decline in the
number of capital executions and/or sentences may indeed be evidence
that few circumstances justify executing a fifteen or sixteen year-old,
Justice Scalia was unwilling to interpret this decline as conclusive evi-
dence that such executions have been categorically rejected by the
American public.8 '
4. Socioscientific Evidence
For Justice Scalia, cruel and unusual death penalty determinations
stop after an analysis of state statutes. In his opinion, evolving stan-
dards of decency must be ascertained from societal standards as re-
flected "in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the
people have approved." 5 He dismissed the relevance of so-called "soci-
oscientific" evidence employed by the Thompson plurality." Such evi-
dence focuses on the reduced moral capability of children, and the pe-
nological failure of the death penalty to deter juvenile offenders. None
of these considerations, Justice Scalia argued, is representative of every
sixteen year-old or every seventeen year-old, and individuated consider-
ation is a fundamental requirement of Eighth Amendment analysis.87
In arriving at their decision, Justice Scalia wrote that the Justices
had "looked not to [their] own conceptions of decency, but to those of
modern American society as a whole."88 In the footnote that followed
82. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
83. Id. at 869.
84. Id. at 869; accord Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
plurality).
85. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (Scalia, J., plurality).
86. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-24 (Steven, J., plurality). See also id. at 853-54
(O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The
Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death
Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 696 (1983) (cautioning that setting a constitutional
minimum death penalty age "requires a considerable analytical step beyond these
precedents toward the identification of classes of persons exempted from capital punish-
ment by reason of their status-age rather than of the quality of their acts.").
87. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375 ("In the realm of capital punishment in particular,
'individualized consideration [is] a constitutional requirement.' ") (citing Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
88. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (Scalia, J., plurality).
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this passage, he noted that "it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various
amici . . . that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant."89
C. Juvenile Justice System
The argument has been made that executing juvenile offenders is
cruel and unusual punishment because of their reduced moral responsi-
bility.90 Advocates of this view cite the various ways our society recog-
nizes this diminished ability: a minimum driving age, a minimum
drinking age, and a minimum age to vote and be drafted.9 1 Therefore,
they contend that criminal accountability should also be adjusted for
juveniles and the death penalty abolished for persons below the age of
eighteen. 92 In response, this author points to the juvenile justice system,
a mechanism established separate and apart from the adult system,
which is intended to meet these very concerns.93
Though the focus of the juvenile justice system is on rehabilitation
and treatment, there are juveniles whom the system recognizes are sim-
ply not amenable to treatment, either because of the heinous and despi-
cable nature of the crime, or the frequency of past offenses.94 These
89. Id. at 369 n.1.
90. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)); see also FRANKLIN ZIMRING, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING
YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23
(1988).
91. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824-25.
92. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-25 (Stevens, J., plurality); Glenn M. Bieler, Note,
Death Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTs. 179 (1990).
93. See STEVEN M. Cox & JOHN J. CONRAD, JUVENILE JUSTICE 72 (1978) (not-
ing that juvenile courts are to administer the law "in a general atmosphere of parental
concern rather than with punitive overtones"); see also ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).
94. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 365. (noting that petitioner had been
waived into the adult system because of the seriousness of his crime and because of
"the unsuccessful attempts of the juvenile justice system to treat him for numerous
instances of past delinquency").
Maryland's waiver statute provides for the following considerations before waving
a juvenile offender into the adult criminal justice system: (1) Age of the child; (2)
Mental and physical condition of the child; (3) The child's amenability to treatment in
any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents; (4) The nature of the
offense and the child's alleged participation in it; and (5) The public safety. MD. CODE
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3.817 (1991).
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juveniles are either waived into the adult system after a juvenile court
has conducted hearings or are statutorily excluded9" from the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court. 96 In short, the juvenile justice system extends
many due process rights plus additional safeguards to the juvenile
offender.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Treaties
Those who share the view that the United States is in contraven-
tion of international human rights standards by permitting a juvenile
death penalty point to three treaties. 97 Each treaty contains a provision
prohibiting the execution of juveniles below eighteen years of age at the
time of the offense: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); 98 the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR);99 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC)."0 The ICCPR and the ACHR were signed by Presi-
95. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-804(e) (excluding a child
14 years old or older charged with a crime punishable by death or life inprisonment).
96. See Elizabeth W. Browne, Guidelines for Statutes for Transfer of Juveniles
to Criminal Court, 4 PEPP. L. REV. 479, 480-81 (1977). In addition to waiver hearings
and statutory exclusion, a juvenile offender may also be tried in the adult system by
prosecutorial discretion. Id.
97. AMNESTY, supra note 1, at 78-79; Lisa Kline Arnett, Comment, Death at an
Early Age: International Law Arguments Against the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 251-53 (1988); Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law
Against the Federal and State Governments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (1991) [herein-
after Judicial Enforcement]; Donald T. Fox, Current Development: Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
601 (1988).
98. The relevant provision is included in Article 6(5) and states that "sentence of
death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 370 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976).
99. The relevant provision is found in Article 4(5), which sets forth: "Capital pun-
ishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed,
were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age .. " American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, I.L.M. 673, 676 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
100. The relevant provision is included in Article 37(a) and provides that: "No
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman punishment. Neither capital
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for
offenses committed by persons below eighteen years of age .. " United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
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dent Carter in 1977 but neither has been ratified by the United States
Senate at the time of this writing. 10 1 The U.N. Convention has been
neither signed nor ratified.' 02
In the event that any of the above were ratified,103 the inclusion of
provisions which are overtly contrary to the Constitution would render
these treaties domestically inoperative.' 4 The Supremacy Clause de-
mands that "the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; . .",15 The Court articulated this point in Reid v.
Covert:0
6
There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties
and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with
the provisions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the
debates which accompanied the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution which even suggests such a result .... It would be
manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill
of Rights-let alone alien to our entire constitutional history
and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the United
States to exercise power under an international agreement with-
out observing constitutional prohibitions." 7
B. Customary International Law
Presently, neither U.S. constitutional law nor treaty law supports
101. See supra notes 98, 99.
102. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War also prohibits the imposition of capital punishment against juveniles and
has been ratified by the United States. However, the provisions of this treaty apply only
during wartime. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
103. No treaty can become binding upon the United States without first achieving
two-thirds approval of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
104. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (Black, J.).
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
106. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
107. Id. at 16-17; see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 248 (1960); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United
States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1562-63 (1984) (noting that "a treaty inconsistent
with the Constitution may be binding internationally but will not be enforced as law in
the United States") [hereinafter International Law].
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the contentions of Amnesty and those who share its perspective that the
United States is domestically obligated to abstain from imposing capi-
tal punishment upon juvenile offenders. The abstention, it is argued, is
mandated by customary international law-an area of law based not on
principles which have been studied, debated, clearly articulated and ul-
timately adopted by member States, but by "the customs and usages of
civilized nations."108
The Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations defines customary
international law as "a general and consistent practice of States fol-
lowed by them from a sense of legal obligation."' 109 The Restatement's
drafters acknowledged the difficulties of the definition by noting that
"there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must
be" °10 and "[lit is often difficult to determine when that transformation
[from mere custom] into law has taken place." ''
Determining the prevalence and consistency of a state's practice,
in addition to ascertaining the basis of a state's adherence to a particu-
lar norm have been the subjects of much debate. Assuming these que-
ries could be answered with any precision, there remains the task of
discerning whether in fact an international norm prohibits juvenile ex-
ecutions"" and whether the United States has sufficiently "protested"
the norm to exempt itself effectively from compliance. 1 3 Each of these
considerations is discussed in further detail below.
1. State Practice
Determining the existence of a state practice is difficult for several
reasons. First, there is no definitive list of state activities which conclu-
sively establish a state practice. The Restatement considers "diplomatic
acts and instructions as well as public measures and other governmen-
tal acts and official statements of policy"11 as evidence of state prac-
108. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also STATUTE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. 993.
110. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmt. b.
111. Id. § 102 cmt. c; see also Henkin, International Law, supra note 107, at
1566 (describing the development of customary international law as a process that "is
hardly certain and remains somewhat mysterious").
112. Hartman, supra note 86, at 669.
113. The RESTATEMENT explains that a state that "indicates its dissent from a
practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule
even after it matures." RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmt. d. See discussion
infra part III.B.3.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmt. b.
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tice, while the leading cases in this area suggest "the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works of jurists" would indicate state prac-
tice."15 One commentator has gone so far as to assert that only the
physical actions of a state are probative.""0 Second, there appears to be
little, if any, indication from either the Restatement or the case law
regarding the appropriate weight to be given to these various state ac-
tions. Theoretically then, the works of jurists could play a significant
role in evidencing a state practice and would thus bind States to a rule
of international law predicated on the subjective, albeit scholarly, inter-
pretations of those writers asserting an opinion on the issue." 7
Turning now to the death penalty, and assuming that general phil-
osophical consensus cannot substitute for empirical data, a global study
of sentencing decisions and penal codes is required to determine
whether a widespread state practice exists against the execution of ju-
venile offenders."' Such an empirical study presents its own set of
problems. Not only is a global analysis a tremendous and time-laden
undertaking, but it is not always possible to obtain complete, much less
accurate, information." 9 Assuming a complete study could be accom-
plished, the ascertainment of state practice is stymied by yet another
obstacle: that of the number of States which must adhere to a practice
115. Hartman, supra note 86, at 667 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980)); see also Judicial Enforcement, supra note 97, at 1273; The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981).
116. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
88-89 (1971); see also Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 119
(dissent of Judge Read).
117. Indeed, Professor Hartman cautions:
[T]he process of formation of customary international law must be more com-
plex and demanding than these decisions would imply, or binding rules of law
would be created simply by the pious expressions of human rights ideals by
public international bodies, national officials and scholars. A crucial if ill-de-
fined quantum of evidence of state practice is the first prerequisite for the
existence of a customary norm, but it is difficult to determine how much is
enough. Moreover, there is uncertainty as to what we are looking for, even
before we decide how much of it we need.
Hartman, supra note 86, at 668-69. See also D'AMATO, supra note 116, at 10 n.3
("Judges have often emphasized that writers record and interpret custom but do not
create it ....").
118. Hartman, supra note 86, at 669.
119. Id. ("Since 1959, the United Nations has endeavored to compile accurate
information concerning the imposition of capital punishment by member nations, [cite
omitted] and empirical studies have been undertaken by groups such as Amnesty Inter-
national, but the available studies have been woefully incomplete.") (citation omitted).
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to constitute a sufficiently widespread practice.12 In the words of one
writer, "[tlhere is no metaphysically precise (such as 'seventeen repeti-
tions') or vague (such as 'in the Court's discretion') answer possible.
States do not organize their behavior along absolute lines. There is no
international 'constitution' specifying when acts become law."12' By
way of example, there are some judges who require unanimity in state
practice before concluding that a rule of customary international law
has been created.122 If this interpretation were correct, the five nations
in addition to the United States, as reported by Amnesty International,
who permit the execution of persons under the age of eighteen, would
be sufficient to strike down state practice.
One writer has suggested that the "number of [s]tates needed to
create a rule of customary law varies according to the amount of prac-
tice which conflicts with the rule."12 3 Arguably then, with the United
States as a world leader in establishing human rights norms,1 2" a great
number of states would be required in order to refute the U.S., and to
establish that eighteen is the minimum age at which an offender may
be executed. That the seventy-two States' 26 which set eighteen as the
minimum age sufficiently outweigh the six States that continue to im-
pose it (even with the United States among them), is undoubtedly true.
The point, however, should be reasserted; the task of determining state
practice is not at all marked by crystalline standards-but is subject to
wide interpretation.
2. Opinio Juris
State practice is not the end of the analysis of customary interna-
tional law; a more elusive element remains. The psychological compo-
nent, opinio juris, must be satisfied as well.' 2 Opinio juris, or "legal
duty," is essentially the motivation behind adherence to the particular
120. Again, the Restatement uses broad language: "A practice can be general
even if it is not universally followed; there is no precise formula to indicate how wide-
spread a practice must be, but it should reflect wide acceptance among the states par-
ticularly involved in the relevant activity." RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmt.
b.
121. D'AMATO, supra note 116, at 91.
122. Michael Akehurst, Custom As A Source of International Law, 47 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1974).
123. Id. at 18.
124. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
125. In 1991, Amnesty International released the results of its global study and
reported that at least 72 countries set 18 or above as a minimum age at which capital
punishment may be imposed. AMNESTY, supra note 1, at 78.
126. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102(2).
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state practice. If a state engages in a particular practice "which is gen-
erally followed but [which] States feel legally free to disregard," then
the engagement may not be counted towards establishing a state prac-
tice.12 If, however, a state adheres to a practice with the belief that the
state is legally obligated to adhere to it, then the requisite opinio juris
has been satisfied.1" As articulated by The International Court of
Justice:
The States concerned must feel they are conforming to what
amounts to a legal obligation: the frequency, or even habitual
character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many
international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial [sic] and pro-
tocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are
motivated by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradi-
tion, and not by any sense of legal duty.12 9
This requirement raises conceptual difficulties. Essentially, a state must
adhere to a particular practice with the belief that it is law, when in
fact it is not necessarily so.130
If practice alone is not sufficient to verify opinio juris, indicators
other than state practice must be relied upon. The Restatement does
not require "explicit evidence of legal obligation (e.g., by official state-
ments)" but instead permits inferences of opinio juris drawn from
"acts or omissions."131 Other writers have looked to States' official
statements for evidence of state belief regarding a particular prac-
tice, 132 requiring statements that affirmatively indicate a State's belief
that a practice is binding as law, rather than an indication that a prac-
tice "ought to be law, or that it is required by morality, courtesy, com-
ity, social needs, etc." ' 33
In the context of the juvenile death penalty, proving "that a state's
treatment of its own citizens in such areas as capital punishment is
directed by consciousness that its actions are governed by international
legal obligations" is a difficult burden to meet. 3 . This is particularly
127. Id. § 102 cmt. c.
128. Id.
129. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44.
130. Akehurst, supra note 122, at 32.
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmt. c.
132. See Akehurst, supra note 122, at 36-37; see also Hartman, supra note 86, at
671; see also D'AMATO, supra note 116, at 75.
133. Akehurst, supra note 122, at 37.
134. Hartman, supra note 86, at 670.
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true in light of the fact that neither U.S. legislatures nor courts often
articulate an express reliance on international norms in setting a mini-
mum age at which the death penalty may be imposed.' Short of ob-
scure theories of natural law and positivism,' 6 little evidence has been
proffered to demonstrate that the requisite opinio juris element has
been satisfied.13 7
Some writers have argued that by signing the aforementioned
treaties and by supporting the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,188 the United States has acknowledged an international norm
against the execution of juvenile offenders. 3 9 As to the former, the cod-
ification of standards in international treaties is not dispositive evidence
of a customary norm,4 0 and at least one source has suggested that the
failure to ratify a treaty "constitutes a silent rejection of the treaty."''
Regarding the latter, declarations are not per se binding instru-
ments evincing legal rights and obligations. If the circumstances, in-
cluding the intent of the parties, indicate the nonbinding status of the
instrument, then no legal obligations are imposed upon the member
States: " 2 "what [S]tates do is more weighty evidence than their decla-
135. See id. at 671. Furthermore, Justice Scalia has gone so far as to denounce
the role of international considerations on domestic policy: "[W]here there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlight-
ened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Ameri-
cans through the Constitution." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4.
136. For a discussion of these theories, see Hartman, supra note 86, at 671.
137. At least one writer has collapsed the opinio juris requirement into the state
practice requirement. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 97, at 1273.
138. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), Pt. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948), reprinted in MALCOM D. EVANS, BLACKSTONE'S INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 39-42 (1991) [hereinafter cited as LAW DOCUMENTS].
139. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 97, at 1273.
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102(3) ("International agreements create
law for the parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law
when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted.") (emphasis added). See also Baxter, Treaties and Custom, in Louis
HENKIN ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 78 (1987) ("Rules
found in treaties can never be conclusive evidence of customary international law.")
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS]. This point is particularly
important in light of consistent U.S. refusal to adhere to such a norm domestically. For
a discussion of the role of protest to an international norm, see discussion infra part
III.B.3.
141. Baxter, supra note 140, at 79.
142. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 301 cmt. e. See also D'AMATO, supra
note 116, at 6 ("Such resolutions are authority for the content of customary law only if
they claim to be declaratory of existing law.").
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rations or the resolutions they vote for."' 4 As explained by Eleanor
Roosevelt, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and a U.S.
representative in the General Assembly at the time the Declaration was
adopted, the Declaration "is not and does not purport to be a statement
of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of
human rights and freedoms . . . to serve as a common standard of
achievement for all people of all nations."'"4 The "statements of those
voting for it [indicate further that] the declaration was not intended to
be a statement of existing law."'1 5
As a final matter, the significant role played by the U.S. Bill of
Rights in the development and language of the Universal Declaration
should not be misconstrued. As Henkin has observed, "Americans were
prominent among the architects and builders of international human
rights, and American constitutionalism was a principal inspiration and
model for them."' 46 It is not surprising then, that "most of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are in their essence American
constitutional rights projected around the world. 1 47 Notwithstanding
U.S. recognition and support of human rights, it must be remembered
that, from the U.S. perspective, the imposition of the death penalty
upon a juvenile offender whose rights have been protected by a care-
fully constructed juvenile justice system'14 does not violate the of-
fender's human rights. Though the United States is indeed a strong
proponent of human rights, support of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights should not be understood to represent U.S. acknowledg-
ment of a binding international norm.
3. Protest
Notwithstanding other elements of customary international law,
any state that "indicates its dissent from the principle during its devel-
opment" will not be bound by the principle "even after it matures."' 149
For those who claim that the United States violates customary interna-
tional law by executing juvenile offenders, it is perhaps this aspect of
143. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 103 reporters' note 2.
144. 5 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1965).
145. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 140, at 115.
146. Richard B. Lillich, Rights-Here and There: The Constitution and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 852 (1989) (quoting Louis Henkin,
Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 407 (1979)).
147. Id.
148. See discussion supra part II.C.
149. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 cmts. c, d.
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customary law that is the most difficult to refute convincingly. 150
The "protest" provision is included within the Restatement be-
cause of "an accepted application of the traditional principle that inter-
national law essentially depends on the consent of States.' 15 ' The Re-
statement gives little further guidance as to what will be sufficient to
qualify as a declaration of dissent. The generally accepted rule, how-
ever, seems to indicate that a protest must be clear and continuous in
order to exempt a state from the binding effect of a developing interna-
tional standard. 152
U.S. protest to a rule against the execution of juvenile offenders
can be seen in the debates surrounding each of the aforementioned
treaties. For example, during the Third Committee debates regarding
Article Six of the ICCPR's provision prohibiting the imposition of the
death penalty against persons below the age of eighteen, the United
States abstained from voting on the provision. The U.S. declination
was, in part, the result of U.S. opposition to human rights treaties that
would subordinate the Constitution to treaty provisions.' 83 Though the
United States strongly supported human rights, various provisions of
the ICCPR did not comply with the Constitution.154 In an attempt to
reconcile the U.S. position, President Carter submitted a letter to the
Senate for advice and consent proposing, among other things, a reser-
vation which would permit the United States to impose capital punish-
ment against persons under the age of eighteen. 55 The letter, in part,
advised that the "United States reserves the right to impose capital
punishment on any person duly convicted under existing or future laws
permitting the imposition of capital punishment."' 5 6 Furthermore, the
Covenants, 57 as noted by the U.S. delegate, "could not authorize or
150. Many have accused the United States of failing to exempt itself by not per-
sistently objecting to the abolition of the death penalty for persons below 18 at the time
of the offense. See authorities cited supra note 97.
151. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 102 reporters' note 2.
152. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1966).
153. See discussion of U.S. opposition to human rights treaties infra part IV.
154. In addition to Article 6, Article 20 of the ICCPR conflicted with the right to
free speech as protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 2; see President's Human Rights Treaty Message to the Senate,
14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc 395 (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in Four Treaties
Pertaining to Human Rights: Message from the President of the United States, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. at X-XII [hereinafter Message].
155. Message, supra note 154, at XII.
156. Id.
157. Statements that contribute to opinio juris may take many forms. They can
be made "in the text of a treaty or in the travaux preparatoires. The most obvious
example of such statements is a statement that some or all of the provisions of the
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sanction any measures in the United States which do not conform to
the clear provision of the United States Constitution."'1 58
The State Department used similar language when it issued the
following reservation in response to Article Four (prohibiting capital
punishment below the age of eighteen) of the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR):1' 9 "United States adherence to Article Four
is subject to the Constitution and other law [sic] of the United
States." 160
In addition to express dissent, evidence of U.S. protest to a mini-
mum death penalty age of eighteen can be construed from U.S. reluc-
tance to adopt self-executing human rights treaties.161 A self-executing
treaty needs no domestic implementing legislation. "In general, agree-
ments that can be readily given effect by executive or judicial bodies,
federal or State, without further legislation, are deemed self-executing,
unless a contrary intention is manifest." '162 Self-execution doctrine in
the area of human rights is problematic because treaty provisions be-
come effective following passage of the treaty by the Senate and the
Executive Branch-the House of Representatives takes no part.6 3 Es-
sentially, treaties bypass the legislative lawmaking process. As a result,
the United States has treated many of the human rights treaties as
non-self-executing.16 4
Although self-execution is not explored in depth here, it is men-
tioned to illustrate that, through clear rhetoric in the letters of the
President and the State Department, persistent U.S. refusal to ratify
treaties codifying the rule, and resolute constitutional policy which al-
lows the juvenile death penalty, the United States has made its opposi-
treaty codify (or are declaratory of) existing customary international law.....
Akehurst, supra note 122, at 45.
158. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 15-16 (18th Report 1968).
159. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99.
160. U.S DEP'T OF STATE, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, S. EXEC. Doc. Nos. C-F, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. at XVIII (1978) [hereinafter LETTER OF SUBMITTAL].
161. Message, supra note 154, at VIII, XV (requesting the inclusion of a reserva-
tion declaring the ICCPR to be non-self-executing); LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note
160 (recommending that the United States declare the provisions of the first 32 Arti-
cles of the ACHR (including Article 4(5) regarding the death penalty and juvenile
offenders) as non-self-executing).
162. RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 111 reporters' note 5.
163. Charles W. Stotter, Comment, Self-Executing Treaties and the Human
Rights Provisions of the United Nations Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem, 25
BUFF. L. REV. 773, 774 (1976).
164. R. MACBRIDE, TREATIES VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION (1956); see also Mes-
sage, supra note 154, at VIII, XV; LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 160, at XVIII.
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tion to the rule abundantly clear---clear enough to exempt itself from
the rule.160
IV. AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. OPPOSITION
A. Separation of Powers
Though the Constitution expressly provides that treaties are the
law of the land and supreme over state law, it does not address custom-
ary international law at all.1 66 "[Customary international law] is not
patently part of the 'laws of the United States'; it is not, strictly, fed-
eral law made by the federal government but the law of the interna-
tional community to which the United States contributes only in an
uncertain way and to an indeterminate degree .... ,,167 Customary
international law is essentially the infusion of law, binding upon the
states,"6 which has neither been proposed, drafted nor approved by the
representative branches of our government. In short, customary inter-
national law bypasses the legislative processes of the U.S. lawmaking
mechanism 1 9 and poses judges with the dilemma of political question
doctrine."" For a judge "to enforce the customary international law
prohibition against executing juveniles would foist on the American
people a law on which they did not vote. 171
Additionally, domestic judges are reluctant to enforce customary
international standards as a practical matter 1) because of the inherent
imprecision in determining what exactly the standard is, and if and
when it has become binding law; 172 and 2) because domestic judges do
not hear cases on this area of law on a consistent basis and thus do not
develop the expertise with the substantive provisions of the law that
165. Contra Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group in
Support of Petitioner at 28-29, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-
6169) ("The United States has never affirmatively nor openly opposed the formation of
the customary international norm prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders
. . . .11).
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE- CONSTITUTION 222 (1972) [hereinafter FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION].
167. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 166, at 222.
168. Customary international law is given the same weight as treaty law and thus
is imposed upon the states. See International Law, supra note 107, at 1564.
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Judicial Enforcement, supra note
97, at 1285.
170. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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they do with domestic legislation.' 7" It has been observed that "the Jus-
tices have no matured or clear philosophies; the precedents are flimsy
and often reflect the spirit of another day. 17 4
In sum, there appears to be a justifiable "uneasiness about legiti-
mating the creation of United States domestic law by foreign
governments.9 17 5
B. U.S. Opposition to Human Rights Treaties
Though the drafters' insistence on codification of the Bill of Rights
clearly indicates that human rights were an early concern of the United
States, there has been resistance to ratifying international documents
that attempt to codify these rights. In the mid-1950s, opposition to
human rights treaties' was strong, in part because of the decision in
Missouri v. Holland,' in which the Supreme Court rejected Mis-
souri's argument that "what an act of congress could not do unaided, in
derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do."'178
There was intense fear of federal encroachment on the states under the
guise of federal treaty-making power.' 7 9 The fear was so intense that,
in 1955, Ohio Senator John W. Bricker proposed what became known
as the "Bricker Amendment"- 80 essentially a constitutional amend-
ment providing that no treaty could become binding domestically with-
out implementing legislation. Though the amendment ultimately failed
(by only one vote),' 81 its defeat was secured by Secretary of State Al-
len Dulles' promise that the United States would not become a party to
any human rights treaties.8 "
173. See International Law, supra note 107, at 1561-62.
174. Id.
175. Judicial Enforcement, supra note 97, at 1284-85.
176. The United States refused to ratify both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), Pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948), re-
printed in LAW DOCUMENTS, supra note 138, at 39-42; and the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951).
177. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
178. Id. at 432.
179. See David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Cov-
enants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35, 66 (1978); see also James C. Kitch, The American
Convenfion on Human Rights: The Propriety and Implications of United States Rati-
fication, 12 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 359, 390 (1979).
180. Weissbrodt, supra note 179, at 38 n.45; see also Hartman, supra note 86, at
686 n.113.
181. 100 CONG. REC. 2262 (1954).
182. See Hearings on S.J.. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the
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Despite the amendment's failure, the United States generally con-
siders human rights treaties to be non-self-executing. " Of the six
human rights treaties currently pending before the Senate, all were
submitted with the President's recommendation for a declaration indi-
cating that the substantive provisions would not be self-executing."'8
Notwithstanding philosophical reasons for ratifying treaties with reser-
vations, problems with the language in the treaties justifies U.S. reti-
cence to adopt them without reservations.
A look at the treaties themselves reveals several issues that have
contributed to U.S. caution in ratifying them. The UNCRC, it has
been noted, is significant "not only for its length, fifty-four Articles, but
for the lack of satisfaction or enthusiasm with which it has thus far
been greeted by most governments."' 5 Following the presentation of
the final draft of the document, "an unprecedented 737 paragraph ex-
planatory document" accompanied the text, demonstrating the lack of
general consensus among the drafters.' 86 Another ten years of debate
and revision lapsed before the adoption of the UNCRC, and though
signed by thirty-six co-sponsors, perhaps its completion was prema-
ture.18 7 Many of the sponsors stated that no consensus had been
reached on some of the Articles while others went so far as to intimate
plans to reopen the convention. 88 The ICCPR too is problematic. The
original instrument was not intended as a binding resolution; the Pre-
amble requires only a "responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."' 8 9 Fur-
thermore, the ACHR raised serious questions with respect to domestic
constitutional issues regarding not only capital punishment, but abor-
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1953).
183. International Law, supra note 107, at 1562.
184. MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING FOUR TREATIES PERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Docs. Nos. C-F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. VIII, XI, XV, XVIII
(1978); MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMI-
NATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, S. EXEC. Doc. R, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. IX (1980); Message of the President Transmitting the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
185. Russel L. Barsh, The Convention of the Rights of the Child: A Re-Assess-
ment of the Final Text, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 142, 142 (1989).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Id. at 158 (Article 38, it was contended, had not achieved a consensus and
thus could not be signed by the Netherlands. Venezuela and Switzerland suggested the
possibility of reopening the convention.).
189. LAW DOCUMENTS supra note 138, at 120 (emphasis added).
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tion as well.1 "
V. Is THERE A COMPROMISE?
It has been suggested that international standards and values
could play a role in domestic law without treading upon constitutional
waters.19 The role would be one whereby international custom would
be considered a factor in Eighth Amendment analysis.192 "By using in-
ternational law to inform, or aid in the interpretation of a constitu-
tional right, the right attains greater credence as one that has universal
recognition."' 9 This concept is not a novel one and in fact has been
used frequently by the Court in deciding death penalty cases. In Coker
v. Georgia,94 for example, the Court acknowledged that "the climate
of international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular
punishment" was relevant in ascertaining the appropriateness of the
death penalty in a rape case.198 Likewise, five years later, in Enmund v.
Florida,'9 the Court noted that international opinion "is an additional
consideration.' 97 In Enmund, the Court assessed the practices of other
nations with respect to ancillary involvement in felony murder as one
factor in finding that the death penalty, under the circumstances
presented by the case, violated the Eighth Amendment.9 8 Similarly,
the Court ruled in Thompson v. Oklahoma'99 that the execution of
anyone below sixteen years of age offended "civilized standards of de-
cency" and that such a perspective was consistent with "the leading
members of the Western European community."200 Finally, however,
Justice Scalia in Stanford v. Kentucky,' 0' rejected the practices of
other nations as being dispositive of the answer to whether or not exe-
cution of juvenile offenders violates evolving standards of decency as
defined by the Eighth Amendment. 02
Although today's Court is unwilling to enforce international stan-
190. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art 4.
191. See Arnett, supra note 97, at 257-60 (1988); see also Judicial Enforcement,
supra note 97, at 1275 n.48.
192. Arnett, supra note 97, at 257.
193. Id.; see also Lillich, supra note 146, at 860-62.
194. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
195. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)).
196. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
197. Id. at 796 n.22 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)).
198. Id. at 797.
199. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
200. Id. at 830.
201. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
202. Id. at 369 n.1.
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dards regarding the death penalty, the Court is not blind to their rele-
vance. Perhaps in the coming years, the tide of public opinion will be-
gin to retreat from the position advanced by Justice Scalia. Should that
shift occur, the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis likely will shift
accordingly and continue to reflect U.S. perspectives of decency and
fairness.
VI. CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, the purpose of this Comment is neither to
condone nor defend the morality of the U.S. position on the issue, but
rather to illuminate the complexity of the issue from both international
and domestic perspectives. Amnesty International faces continued do-
mestic resistance to its efforts to prompt the United States to abolish
the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In light of strong U.S. opposi-
tion to the domestic enforceability of human rights treaties and of judi-
cial approval of the juvenile death penalty, it is unlikely that a change
will be forthcoming in the near future. Perhaps the efforts of Amnesty
and other abolitionist supporters would be better served by focusing on
the legislative, rather than judicial, organs of the U.S. government.
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